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The Rortyan Conception of Science 
1 Even though the conception of science was a topic very often analysed in Rorty’s writings,
his approach always attempted to overcome a science-centred perspective of philosophy
and  culture.  Thus,  Rorty  insisted  on  characterising  science  and  knowledge
instrumentally, although he was never particularly interested in deepening into these
perspectives  to  construct  an  explicit  and  systematic  philosophy  of  science  and  its
consequences  for  the  practices  and  conceptions  of  science  itself.  Nonetheless,  his
epistemological reflections on science are fundamental and extensive enough to develop
a philosophical  viewpoint  of  it  with a  pragmatist  and post-positivist  character.  Such
viewpoint  allows  us  to  dissolve  a  substantial  part  of  the  philosophical  problems  of
scientific  practice  becoming a  useful  tool  to  deal  with  contemporary  challenges  and
issues. At the same time, it concurs with the most interesting contemporary proposals
which avoid some classical dichotomies in the field.
2 Throughout his work, there are two main sources to outline the image of science that
Rorty provides us in his philosophy. The first and more general source is his well-known
epistemological analysis of Modernity and Contemporary Philosophy. The second one is
his  particular  characterization  of  scientific  nature  when  he  suggests  a  healthy  and
convenient relation between science and culture. 
3 In the former, the American philosopher reveals the historical and optional nature of the
modern  epistemological  problems  and  perspectives.  He  further  contends  that  the
metaphysics resulting from such a tradition is exhausted after the copious and unsolved
epistemological discussions about truth or rationality and the historical and sociological
studies  of  science  during  the  twentieth  century.  As  a  result,  Rorty  replaces  the
representational character of knowledge with an instrumental view, which does not need
a philosophical theory. He goes on to assert a deflationist perspective of truth, an anti-
Consequences of Rorty’s Pragmatism in Science
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
1
essentialist  assessment  of  reality  and  an  ethnocentric  viewpoint  of  justification  and
rationality. 
4 Consistent with these perspectives, Rorty provides a picture of science drawn from his
Peircean description of beliefs and inquiry as habits of action, and it is specified in his
notions of scientific method, rationality and objectivity. All these conceptions together
lead us to the rejection of empiricism as a foundation of scientific knowledge, and to the
embracement of a fuzzy,  practical  and sociological frontier of science.  In short,  what
Cornel West calls Rorty’s “Emersonian sensibilities” undermines the authority of science
by demythologizing the tradition that provides it a culturally privileged position (West
1989: 204). 
5 As I said, Rorty, following Peirce, conceives beliefs as habits of action that we attribute to
organisms (people)  to predict  or  retrodict  their  behaviour.  In this  way,  beliefs  guide
actions, which produce more actions and then more beliefs in an endless process. Some of
the new beliefs create tensions or contradictions with the old ones, so we can eliminate
some other belief or create a new one to reduce or avoid these tensions. Therefore, beliefs
are guides of actions, which compose a web of relations that is constantly evolving and
reweaving  these  relations  (Rorty  1991a:  93).  Consequently,  every  object  is  always
contextualized because it is part of such a web. This process also explains the nature of
inquiry. Inquiry implies a large-scale and deliberate reweaving of our beliefs to integrate
new ones. In his words: “They (beliefs) may lead to ‘reflex’ actions or they may initiate
scientific breakthroughs.” (Rorty 1991a: 94). Then, if the number of changes in the web
continues to increase, at some point we can speak of the “recontextualization” of the
object. This recontextualization can be perfectly conceived as a new scientific theory, the
development and description of which implies a radical reconfiguration of the positivistic
conception of science.
6 In particular, Rorty points out how philosophy since Modernity has been looking for a
philosophical explanation of scientific success. The metaphor that provided an attractive
yet ambiguous answer to this question involves the Galilean idea that a mathematical and
reductionist vocabulary was the discovery of Nature’s own language, and thus, it is an
image  of  the  way  things  really  and  truly  are.  Then,  this  philosophical  tradition
interpreted the success and usefulness of Galileo’s ultimate terminology as a signal of its
intrinsic reality because of its lack of human interest or moral significance (Rorty 1982:
191-3). In this way, scientific generalizations embracing efficient predictions provided a
philosophical  content  to  the  conception of  scientific  method.  Since  then,  prediction,
control  and  what  Rorty  calls  Galilean  axiological  neutrality  become  a  metaphysical
process which screens subjective aspects of our descriptions, even if it is unclear in the
history of science which general but not trivial procedures compose such a method (Rorty
1982: 194). 
7 Unlike this philosophical view, and according to the concrete development of scientific
theories, Rorty says, scientists use the same obvious procedures that everybody uses in
many activities. They sometimes overlook counterexamples, contradict a criterion, make
assumptions and guesses, etc. Of course, they also make interesting inferences and try to
follow organized and clear procedures for testing their ideas, but this is quite different
from having a reductionist and/or formal language without evaluative terms as a token of
scientificity and reality, which seems to remain an impossible task. In his words: 
In that sense, to have a method was simply to have a good comprehensive list of
topics  or  headings-to  have,  so  to  speak,  an  efficient  filing  system.  In  its  post-
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Cartesian philosophical  sense,  however,  it  does not  mean simply ordering one’s
thoughts, but filtering them in order to eliminate “subjective” or “noncognitive” or
“confused” elements,  leaving only the thoughts which are Nature’s  Own.  (Rorty
1982: 194)
8 In  contrast,  according  to  him,  there  is  no  specific  logic  of  scientific  method,  only
instituted and historical procedures that influence our choice of theories at any given
stage of inquiry. This statement embodies the idea that there is no distinctive scientific
rationality that justifies a special relation of science with reality. In this sense, one of the
main goals in philosophy of science became that of achieving a precise theory of scientific
reasoning and argumentation; a theory that would abstract general patterns from the
debates “over genes and spectra and fields and delinquency” (Rorty 1991b: 53), guiding as
independent criteria for a scientific demarcation. 
9 However, as the history of science has shown us from Kuhn or Feyerabend’s studies, it
seems that there are no such properly scientific general patterns as a set of abstract
criteria for applying. Decisions that scientists make that generate changes in theories are
reweaves of beliefs to attain better control and prediction of phenomena, but this is not a
specific kind of intelligibility. They are familiar procedures of justification used by a given
discipline  or  community.  Indeed,  for  Rorty,  rationality  is  not  a  matter  of  abstractly
applying criteria. Consistent with this perspective, we can explain observations, theories
and decisions made by scientists by reference to the intellectual and social history, as well
as by reference to their respective psychologies, sensibilities and context. 
10 In the same way, Rorty states that following the metaphor initiated by Galileo, Newtonian
Physical Science became a model for the intellectual of modernity, so this prototype of
knowledge should be followed by the establishment of  social,  political  and economic
institutions  because  of  its  access  to  nature  and  its  correspondence  to  reality  itself.
Therefore,  parallel  to  the  method  and  scientific  traditional  conceptions,  objectivity
means  that  we  must  “step  outside  our  community”  in  the  light  of  something  that
transcends it. In other words, as long as scientific inquiry is understood as a way to find
the “underlying structures” or “culturally invariant factors” or “biologically determined
patterns” of reality, objectivity is understood as something common with every other
possible human community or independent of any particular community (Rorty 1991c:
22).
11 Nonetheless,  once  he  had  dismissed  the  epistemological  distinctions  of  method  and
rationality,  objectivity  is  reduced  to  intersubjectivity.  It  is  grounded  in  as  broad  a
community agreement as possible. Thus, the tools of science are not less “merely” human
than those, which make beauty or justice possible (Rorty 1991b: 58).  This means that
objectivity works the same way for physics as for literary theory, because the difference
between  them  is  relative  to  the  goal  of  each  discipline,  and  science  requires  more
agreement  than arts  according to  its  predictive intentions  (Rorty 1998:  139).  Indeed,
Rorty dissociates this possibility of control of phenomena from being non perspectival or
mind-independent. 
12 Now, even though Rorty redefined these notions involved in scientific development, we
can still contend that experience has a crucial role to play in science that it does not have
in  other  languages  or  practices.  Contemporary  philosophy  usually  preserves  a  very
intuitive and common idea that science deals with hard facts. According to this popular
empiricist perspective, this hardness of facts is a properly scientific distinction. However,
Rorty  follows  the  viewpoint  that  connects  Sellars  to  Brandom,  which  proposes
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substituting  the  conception  of  perceptive  experience  for  the  conception  of  non-
inferential statements caused by the physiological conditions of the sensorial organs, this
is,  that  physical  stimuli  have a causal  rather than rational  role in the production of
beliefs.
13 In this way Rorty (1991d) offers an analysis of science that understands the supposed
hardness of facts as a result of previous agreements within a community. We respect the
rules  of  a  certain  language  game  whose  purposes  require  broad  agreement  and
homogeneity, and those rules are cultural products.
14 As a result, there are no epistemological distinctions between scientific procedures or
objects and other social practices and stuffs. Rorty makes a description in which every
fact is a social institution and, at the same time, it is not arbitrary or merely conventional
as opposed to natural, because science is not natural in kind. In the same way, some of
these institutions are more internally diverse, more complicated or, as he says, “more
quarrelsome about desiderata” (Rorty 1991d:  84).  Most of the time,  science has more
instituted procedures, but this is explained by its focus on control and prediction, as I
stated above. Even so, it can also be as revolutionary and as inventive as politics and arts.
It has a practical and sociological boundary; therefore, the questions about the sentences
that are “made true by the world or reality” are definitely discarded and, then, “literary
texts are not squishier than molecules” (Rorty 1991e: 40).
 
Science as Power: Rortyan Connections and
Usefulness
15 Knowledge as a web of useful beliefs that are justified in a particular time is relative to
the different purposes a culture or a community is engaged with. However, the ends or
purposes are always evolving, mainly according to a set of values and forms of social
organization. Consequently, from this perspective there is an imminent and fundamental
shift in concerns from epistemological to ethical-political in scientific practice. This shift
is mostly consistent with Feyerabend’s perspective of scientific nature as well as with the
Baconian  perspective  that  knowledge  is  not  separable  from  power,  and  so,  it  also
resonates with the Foucaultian epistemes. 
16 Therefore, this whole framework provides us not only with a new and clearly enclosed
place of science in cultural development, but also with a new perspective for describing
and explaining scientific theories and their connection with other vocabularies as a part
of a cultural politics. Rorty clearly states that if reductionist and mathematical language
has been a useful tool for prediction, there can be better options of means and ends in
arts, politics, or morals. As a result, he rather supports a healthy plurality of languages,
which affords different tools for each new aim. 
17 One of  the  most  important  political  implications  of  this  fuzziness  of  science  and its
constraint  to  some  specific  goals  in  social  life  is  a  reformulation  of  the  Deweyan
deconstruction of the culture-nature distinction.1 If science is not a natural kind, and
there is  no reality in itself,  then there is  also no human nature in itself.  Therefore,
according to Rorty (2004), the old question about our natural or cultural nature became
irrelevant or sterile,  and science cannot (or should not)  provide us with a definitive
answer about what we really are. As he emphatically states in his article “Philosphy-
envy,” physical, chemical and biological discoveries can tell us interesting things about
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how our bodies and brains work, but they cannot tell us “what sort of behaviour [to]
encourage” (Rorty 2004: 21) or how we should live, nor can it provide a foundation for
organizing our social lives. From this post-positivistic perspective of science, the latter
has worn-out its usefulness for political ends because it is not the foundation of culture,
and it is neither an example of social cooperation nor public deliberation different from
any other discipline.2
18 In this  way Rorty is  partially connecting the Deweyan and Foucaultian perspectives,3
refusing  the  traditional  conceptions  of  knowledge,  science,  and  its  epistemological
categories, and redefining them as a product of history and social processes. If there are
no universal structures of reality, science becomes a set of traits of power arrangements
that can be desirable or undesirable according to different purposes, and in natural or
social science their genealogical narratives are useful for lightening and valuing means as
well as ends. In this new light we can explore scientific narratives, structures and their
close connections to social development by exposing different key cultural features that
condition and predetermine it. At the same time, we can also show how some scientific
vocabularies  justified  a  specific  political  project,  legitimized  by  putative  traditional
scientific objectivity and rationality. 
19 In addition, this Rortyan perspective of science is quite close to the most interesting
contemporary proposals in philosophy of science. In recent decades, taking historicism
and the sociological perspectives inherited from Kuhn and Feyerabend’s views seriously,
an important amount of work has been made. However, even though many authors have
been exploring and recognize science as a value-laden activity,4 many of them insist on an
external  role  of  non-epistemic values  in the stages of  science.  This  external-internal
distinction  in  scientific  development  implies  that  scientific  development  demands  a
rational critique independent of the social context, and subsequently, this context is only
contingently involved in it.5 Nonetheless, other authors such as Heather Douglas (2007)
state  that  the  epistemic–non-epistemic  distinction  is  not  clear  enough  to  support  a
normative difference in scientific practice. According to her, non-epistemic values are
logically needed for reasoning in science, even in the internal states of the process. This
allows her to argue that there is nothing necessary about the link between axiological
neutrality and objectivity, so that we can discard the value-free meaning of the latter
(Douglas 2007: 131). Moreover, such a perspective enables her to develop a conception of
objectivity  in  science  taking  into  account  different  scientific  virtues  in  different
situations, just as Rorty does. 
20 On the other hand, Arthur Fine (1986) in what he calls the “Natural Ontological Attitude”
tries to reject the assumptions of the debates on scientific realism and anti-realism that
bring unnecessary and unjustified philosophical interpretations of science, and according
to Rorty this attitude is closely connected to his own suggestion that “Reality as it is in
itself” is just another way to insist on God’s authority, or that the idea “that Physics gets
you closer to reality than morals as an updated version of the priests’ claim to be in closer
touch with God than the laity” (Rorty 2007: 134). Thus, his view of science implies that it
is not philosophically different from the rest of culture in any meaningful way.6 In a
similar  way,  Lawrence  Sklar  (2000)  contends  that  the  best  arguments  are  local  and
contextual, and they do not appeal to universal philosophical principles.
21 However, perhaps one of the most radical and closest approaches to Rortyan perspective
is Harold Kincaid’s contextualism (2007). In it, he states that there are no global criteria
for deciding which beliefs or principles of inference have epistemic priority. Justification
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in science is relative to a specific context specified by the questions to be answered. Just
as Rorty, he rejects foundationalist approaches in epistemology and he contends an anti-
essentialist  view about  theories.  As  a  result,  there is  no special  set  of  rules  with an
inherent epistemological status (Kincaid 2007: 223).
22 Likewise,  Hugh  Lacey  develops  the  interesting  idea  that  objects  are  simultaneously
objects of materialist understanding and objects of social values; so that we structure the
world in ways that partially represent the embodiment of such social values (Lacey 1999:
106-7). In particular, he states that adopting modern values of control and prediction has
been reinforcing the idea of gaining understanding under materialist strategies, so that
objects are grasped in order to become “objects of control,” thereby subordinating other
social values, such as moral values, and implicitly informing practices that serve some
kind of specific values, for example, economic values. This reinforcement consolidated
control and prediction values and their materialist characterization as features of how
the world “really is.” In this way, he says, “exercising control over things has become
considered as a value unsubordinated to other social values” (Lacey 1999: 112), and daily
life and institutions have become dominated by it. Conversely, he states similarly to Rorty
that:  “Not  every  effective  intentional  interaction  with  the  world  is  an  instance  of
control.” (Lacey 1999: 111). As both of them state, there is no argument independent of
success  for  interpreting  science  as  greater  comprehensiveness  of  reality.  Moreover,
prediction  and  control  as  signs  of  reality  ignores  other  fundamental  dimensions  of
reality, and it easily hides social, ethical or political possibilities embodied in them (Lacey
1999: 137).
23 In  summary,  the  Rortyan  perspective  implies  an  ethical  and  political  turn,  which
connects to the latter specific perspectives on science with a broader post positivistic
conception of culture, creating a useful tool for analysing scientific theories in such often
ignored  dimensions.  It  also  shows  what  Cornel  West  (1989)  named post-structuralist
resonances, but complementing it with an insightful perspective of scientific activity and
its legitimation. 
 
Some Scientific Examples in the Rortyan Landscape
24 Finally,  I  analyse some examples  that  illuminate the accuracy and usefulness  of  this
perspective. These examples show in different dimensions and in particular cases, some
of the statements about science I previously pointed out from Rorty’s writings and its
consequences. 
25 The first example involves the origin of the Principle of Complementarity in Quantum
Mechanics. This principle, along with the Heisenberg’s Principle of Indeterminacy, is the
core of the Copenhaguen Interpretation of Quantum Physics, and was elaborated by Niels
Bohr in 1927. At the end of 1925 there were two different well-founded mathematical
structures  that  accounted  for  atomic  phenomena:  the  wave  and  matrix  mechanics.
However, those structures had different guiding principles and methods; moreover, they
emphasized different features of atomic events, especially continuity and discontinuity,
an  intuitive  visualization  and  an  anti-intuitive  abstraction,  respectively  (Schrödinger
1982: 45). 
26 In addition, the use of the classical conceptions of wave and particle for describing atomic
results led to unavoidable contradictions because the same object sometimes seemed to
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be a particle and sometimes seemed to be a wave. This scenario was completely confusing
for physicists because Nature seemed to have an irrational and inconsistent behavior.7
Heisenberg  remembered the  question he  repeated to  himself  again  and again:  “‘Can
nature possibly be as absurd as it seems to us in these atomic experiments?” (Moore 1966:
147). Eventually, it became clear that quantum equations lack an interpretation using the
ordinary and classical  concepts and images (Cassidy 1992:  227).  In this  context,  Bohr
elaborated the Principles of Complementarity to provide Quantum Theory with a new
logical  and  conceptual  framework  for  interpreting  atomic  events.  That  principle
establishes the wave and particle duality, such that both conceptions are necessary but
mutually exclusive to account for the electron’s behaviour: it is corpuscular or wavelike
depending on the experimental device we use to measure it.8 
27 The  origin  of  this  principle  can  be  traced  back  to  formalism and  empirical  results.
However, they are necessary but insufficient conditions to explain its occurrence. Indeed,
through his  writings  after  1927  Bohr  develops  his  original  philosophical  perspective
concerning  his  general  conceptions  of  nature,  experience,  language,  phenomena  or
knowledge, as well as his conceptions of objectivity and truth.9 In particular, he states
that  experience  allows  us  to  establish  laws  for  understanding  natural  phenomena;
however,  these  laws usually  modify  the guidelines  which order  the very experience.
Therefore,  a  conceptual  framework  does  not  have  a  structure  or  configuration  that
cannot be modified. For him, science does not look for an a priori and determined reality,
but it develops methods to expand and arrange human experience in a consistent and
unambiguous  way  (Bohr  1958).  This  is  the  basis  of  objective  knowledge.  He  is  also
convinced that we need classical categories of wave and particle to make an intuitive
description of quantum events, because our necessary and normal forms of perception
are in the classical language (Feyerabend 1962: 228-31). These general ideas allowed him
to develop the idea of Complementarity. 
28 Thus,  in  philosophy  of  physics  different  authors  connect  the  Principle  of
Complementarity with different ideas of Bohr’s psychological and intellectual history.
Some  scholars  of  Bohr  have  established  different  influences  from  psychology  and
philosophy that allowed him to formulate this Principle. Particularly, the influence of the
philosopher Harald Høffding is noteworthy, and through him, there are important traces
of Kant, Kierkegaard or James’ ideas.10 For example, Rui Moreira develops the thesis that
Høffding  elaborated  a  principle  of  complementarity  in  psychology  between  a  priori
Kantian sensibility and understanding in a similar way to what Bohr made in Physics, as
incompatible  but  necessary  categories.  He  also  conceives  that continuity  and
discontinuity  are  incompatible  necessities  of  spirit.  This  combination  between
irreconcilable  and  necessary  features  of  reality  is  what  distinguishes  Høffding’s
perspective  and  characterises  Bohr’s  interpretations  of  atomic  events.11 In  addition,
another possible influence, even if it is less clear, is from William James. In his Principles
of  Psychology  he  states  a  principle  of  complementarity  between  conscious  and
subconscious, also in a way that is analogous to the Bohrian complementarity.12 Even if
Bohr used this relation as an analogy to elaborate his quantum interpretation, there is no
clear  evidence  that  he  had  read  James’  ideas  before  he  stated  the  principle  of
complementarity.  Still,  Bohr,  as  well  as  his  colleague  Werner  Heisenberg,  has  an
empiricist attitude in which Quantum Theory only explains or accounts for observable
events, so there is no ontology beyond measurable entities. This attitude has often been
connected to a Pragmatist criterion of truth in the Copenhagen Interpretation.
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29 In  summary,  those  studies  outline  Bohr’s  interpretation  of  quantum  events as  a
framework influenced by a philosophical and psychological attitude that was a result of
his cultural and intellectual environment, thereby supporting the Rortyan statement that
there is no explanation in science directly stemming from hard facts; physical stimuli on
atomic  experience  had  a  causal  role  in  the  production  of  beliefs;  experiments  and
predictions were not enough to give a consistent interpretation of atomic events; the use
of additional assumptions and relations was, indeed, necessary. Similarly, these examples
show that justification comes from particular rules that are followed in a specific context.
The best evidence for this statement is the permanent opposition that Complementarity
has faced and the diverse interpretations in conflict that Quantum Mechanics has had so
far.13 
30 The second example, and perhaps the most politically interesting, concerns the origin of
molecular biology and in particular of genetics.14 This origin has been widely studied by
historians and philosophers alike. They have pointed out a set of social factors which had
an major influence on the institutionalization of the gene’s paradigm during the first half
of the twentieth century. Although the results are controversial, an important part of
these studies use the Foucaultian relation between truth and power to account for the
economical and ideological factors which promoted this model.15 Some of these analyses
suggest that a technocratic environment in a liberal  and pragmatic American society
enabled, through different structures and institutions, its epistemological hegemony. 
31 Maybe the most often mentioned and analysed institution is the Rockefeller Foundation,
which sponsored numerous  life  sciences  projects  during the  1930s,  pervading in  the
academic perspectives, strategies and politics which guided the scientific development in
this  field.  According to Lily  E.  Kay (1993),  the Foundation had,  on the one hand,  an
economic  interest  in  the  nuclear  model  of  inheritance  for  pushing  the  productivity
growth through crossbreeding of plants and animals, and on the other, an ideological
interest for achieving a social control through inheritance to guide human behaviour
according to a system of Protestant and conservative values. The Foundation and some
groups close to it were looking to realize a world of social prosperity and progress using
human engineering. 
32 It  is  well  known that  the model  of  the gene as  the building-block of  life  obeyed an
ontological  and methodological  analogy with the model  which takes the atom as the
building-block of matter in a reductionist and mechanistic view of life, which emphasised
its conceptual unity. The gene is defined as the fundamental unity of life, and is explored
through mutations and discontinuous changes. Thus, all the biological diversity is the
result of a set of a few laws and principles. In this sense, there was a subtle association of
these epistemological and ontological features of genes, perceived as direct causes of the
macroscopic characteristics (physiological or psychological) of every living creature, with
some ideological perspectives of social life. For example, for some Marxist scientists the
reductionism  was  associated  with  the  capitalist  contradictions  in  the  social  system.
However,  for  the  most  conservative  perspectives,  such  as  that  of  the  Rockefeller
Foundation,  it  portrayed psycho- and socio-biology as a symbol of  control  and social
progress  because  it  allowed  connecting,  albeit  potentially  and  ambiguously,  small
material  unities  to  the  personality  control  conceived by  genetics.  Some perspectives
supported a social physics in a Comptian sense and this reductionist and mechanistic
model linked the “atom” of life to these psycho- and socio-biological perspectives which
resulted more attractive than the holistic and more complex alternatives. 
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33 Likewise, some cognitive preferences between holism or reductionism depended upon the
scientific cultures in different countries, such as the French nationalism, which supported
a  Lamarckism  and  a  more  physiological  perspective  of  inheritance,  the  American
liberalism more committed to nuclear genetics, and the German statism connected to an
embryologist  point  of  view.  This  gives  a  partial  account  of  the  French  and  German
opposition to the reductionism of the nuclear model in spite of its predictive success
(Mayr 1982: 732).
34 Nonetheless, this explanation of the social and empirical success of the nuclear model can
be complemented with the legitimation that it had due to its similarity with the atomic
model in physics. In that way, the chromosomal theory of inheritance was linked to an
ideal of neutral science founded on the scientific metaphysical tradition to support its
objective  nature,  even  though  it  was  connected  with  a  set  of  social  values,  as  the
aforementioned  historical  and  sociological  studies  show.  In  summary,  the  nuclear
epistemological frame resulted in a useful language for some social perspectives, mainly
in America. It was a vocabulary that envisioned and impelled economic profit as a result
of the crossbreeding of plants and animals as well as the ideological project of human
engineering  intended  to  develop  a  psycho-  and  socio-biology  for  ruling  social
organization,  this  is,  the  eugenic  perspective  to  avoid  undesired  features  in  human
behaviour.16 Thus, this conception of life enabled some particular goals and these goals
outlined a conception of life. In summary, the outlined epistemological model of the gene
supported,  indirectly and not unequivocally,  some values in different ways:  from the
conception of objectivity and scientific rigor traditionally attributed to physical science
to the different social aims of some groups that this model seems to make easier. At the
same time, some cultural environments seemed to facilitate more one model than other. 
35 The former elements outline a general anatomy of the conversion of some ideological
factors into cultural and socio-political ones that promote a given model. It can be seen
how social and epistemic values are interconnected in this scientific episode, and how the
conception of the gene became, during its early development, a set of both facts and
values at the same time. This resonance between facts and values supports the Rortyan
critique to the intended axiological neutrality in scientific language and illuminates the
shift to the ethical and political perspective of science.
36 This  case  is  particularly  interesting  and  important  in  the  current  biotechnological
discussions concerning the transgenic debate, the psychochemical approach to human
behaviour, and all  the ethical issues about genetics and biology in general (nutrition,
psychiatry,  etc.).  The  Rortyan  perspective  in  connection  with  the  other  proposals  I
pointed out allows a wide and complete analysis of science in those dimensions inherent
to basic science that is  unavoidably connected with ethical  and political  ends,  and it
avoids  a  simplified,  neutral  and  objective  picture  of  it  that  is  only  well  or  poorly
implemented in our societies. At the same time, and most important, it confines scientific
utility to some particular human projects, becoming clear that for some vocabularies or
practices, such as morals or politics it is better to attain different goals from prediction
and control. 
37 I  think that Rorty missed some of  the consequences of  his own perspective,  perhaps
because he was not interested in specificities about science, or perhaps because he was
more optimistic or naive in relation to power than other thinkers. But as I said at the
beginning of this article, his proposal suggests an interesting way of analysing scientific
practices, theories, and public policies of it that is more radical and advantageous than
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other  perspectives.  It  also  successfully  connects  the  most  interesting  external  and
internal proposals of contemporary scientific views in philosophy and provides a fresh
reference  for  us  to  better  understand  the  way  contemporary  scientific  views  are
embodied in our network of beliefs. 
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NOTES
1. The culture-nature relationship is a theme found throughout Dewey’s works, from at least as
early  as  the  1890s  to  his  last  writings  in  the  early  ’50s.  However,  the  culture-nature  unity
assumed by the philosopher was particularly  evident  in works of  Dewey from the early  and
mid-1920s,  including Human Nature  and Conduct and Experience  and Nature  (See also:  Torres &
Hobbs 2015).
2. Rorty explains that a good example of social cooperation and public deliberation can come in
the same way from engineers, carpenters as well as from scientists in: Rorty 2007a.
3. See: Rorty 1982.
4. For example, see: Kincaid , Dupré & Wylie 2007.
5. See: Doppelt 2007.
6. Even though Rorty disagrees with Fine that the realist is irrational or lacks rational support
such as  the  theist  does,  and he  does  not  share  his  idea  of  ontological  commitment  (for  the
discussion of Rorty about Fine’s perspective, see: Rorty 2007b.
7. To see the problems of the wave and corpuscular interpretation of quantum mathematical
structures see: Rioja 2002.
8. According to Bohr, this complementary nature of quantum events is quantitatively expressed
in the Uncertainty Principle of Heisenberg. To see the complete explanation of Complementarity:
Bohr 1934b.
9. The intellectual development of Bohr’s ideas is chronologically collected in three collections of
writings: Bohr 1934a, 1958, 1963.
10. Jammer  points  out  the  importance  of  Kierkegaard’s  idea,  elaborated  by  Høffding,  that
humans cannot be an impartial  spectator or an impersonal  observer,  because we are always
active participators of knowledge: (Jammer 1966: 173).
11. To see all the connections between Høffding and Complementarity: Moreira 2004.
12. In the section of his book about unconsciousness of hysterics, James states that there are
some cases in which conscience can be split in two coexistent parts, which share the same object
of knowledge, but mutually ignore each other. See: (James 2007: 200-6). 
13. For example: supporters of Bohmian Mechanics or supporters of the statistical interpretation
of Quantum Theory. 
14. I develop this example in extensively in my article (2017).
15. For example: Sapp 1987.
16. However, these are not the only values connected to the model, but the most obvious. 
ABSTRACTS
The aim of this article is to outline a pragmatist image of science following Rorty’s discussions
and critics of epistemology and to develop some consequences of it in the philosophical analysis
and its relations to culture. I will deal with some aspects of how scientific practice is construed
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and understood,  and also  outline  the  shift  in  Philosophy of  Science  from epistemological  to
ethical-political concerns that are implied in his proposal. I will contend that this perspective
suggests an interesting way of analysing scientific practices, theories, and public policies of it.
Furthermore,  I  will  suggest  that  it  successfully  connects  the  most  interesting  proposals  of
contemporary scientific views in philosophy. Finally, I will use some examples in physics and
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